Antulio j echevarria ii biography of michael
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Reconsidering War’s Logic ground Grammar
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Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, a former US Army officer, is currently the Editor-in-Chief of the US Army War College Press and Parameters. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. He holds a doctorate in modern history from Princeton University, and is the author of six books, including After Clausewitz (Kansas 2001), Imagining Future War (2007), Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford 2007), Reconsidering the American Way of War (Georgetown 2014), Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 2017), and War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (Cambridge 2021) as well as more than one hundred articles and monographs on strategic thinking, military theory, and military history. He completed a NATO Fulbright Fellowship in 2000-01, and a Visiting Research Fellowship at Oxford University in 2011-12; he is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and an Adjunct Fellow at the Modern War Institute. He is the winner of five book awards and twelve article awards, and formerly held the US Army War College Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies.
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In his newly published analysis of how the United States has, throughout its history, waged war—Reconsidering the American Way of War—retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II confronts a significant disconnect between popular myths and actual practice: He notes that “many beliefs concerning the American way of war—such as its alleged apolitical and a strategic character and its reputation for using overwhelming force to achieve decisive results—do not, in fact, hold up to scrutiny.” In support of that observation, Echevarria, who is the editor of the U.S. Army War College’s journal Parameters, delivers a concise summary of the American military’s strategic and operational practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan.
Why is it important now to reconsider the American way of war?
It’s important from a political standpoint, because the debates on the American way of war, which really started to escalate around 1999–2000, have shaped how policymakers are considering the use of U.S. military forces. And it’s not just American policymakers—our allies, friends, and foes are looking at how we have used force in the past and are drawing some assumptions from that.
Where did the idea of an American way of war originate?
It really comes from Russell